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Abstract 
This paper gives an overview of the legal system of Switzerland and then compares the 
judiciaries of Switzerland and New Zealand. As far as Switzerland is concerned, it covers 
both the system of the Swiss Federation and the systems in the Cantons. After analysing 
the powers enjoyed by the judiciary via the legislature, the paper examines the 
appointment of judges in detail. The author explains how in Switzerland openly political 
and other considerations are weighed in the course of electing judges and how the 
appointment of lay judges is balanced with an active role of law clerks. In contrast, New 
Zealand has a proud tradition of apolitical judicial appointments that are made solely 
based on merit. The author criticises that Swiss judges are elected for a term of office, 
whereas New Zealand judges enjoy the security of tenure and thus, a greater judicial 
independence. Lastly, the paper covers the removal and discipline of judges, where the 
author, while he commends the recent reform in New Zealand, speaks out for a system 
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I. Introduction  
This paper aims to compare the judiciaries of New Zealand and Switzerland focusing on 
two selected topics: appointment of judges and discipline and removal of judges. How a 
society appoints and, if at all, removes its judges from office provides important 
information about the perceived role and standing of the judiciary. 
For the benefit of the reader unfamiliar with Switzerland’s legal and political systems 
this paper begins with displaying their main features, as understanding them is a 
prerequisite to understanding many of the issues covered in this paper. It then compares 
first the two countries’ court structure and the powers granted to the respective 
judiciaries. 
The paper then examines in depth the procedures of appointment that are followed 
and the goals that are sought to be achieved by following the procedures. Judges in 
Switzerland, both on the Federal level and in the Cantons, are not appointed by the 
Government but elected—either by the parliament or by the people, and following 
political considerations. In contrast, most New Zealand judges are appointed by the 
Governor-General following the advice of the Attorney-General, who selects a candidate 
based on merit. Unlike New Zealand judges, Swiss judges do not enjoy the protection of 
tenure: They are elected for a term of office between four and ten years. 
Then the procedures of dismissal of judges are covered. While the appointment 
procedures in New Zealand and in Switzerland differ fundamentally in almost every 
aspect, some similarities can be found when it comes to removal and discipline. The 
grounds for removal are largely the same, whereas the proceedings are different from 
each other in many ways, even though in both countries the parliaments ultimately decide 
on whether to remove a judge from office. 
The Swiss Federation consists of 26 Cantons, each with a judiciary on their own. This 
paper will cover consistently the Swiss federal judiciary, whereas the judiciary of the 
Cantons will be dealt with somewhat superficially: This paper will attempt to describe 
the—often diverse—legislations found in the Cantons by choosing a few illustrative 
examples. 
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The Federal Government has translated some of the most important Federal acts to 
English. Given that English is not an official language of Switzerland, these translations 
have no legal force and are for information purposes only. They are however published 
on the official website of the Federation together with the official versions of the acts, 
which is why they are hereinafter referred to as “semi-official” translations. Whenever 
such an English translation of a Federal act is available, this paper will make use of it and 
indicate it in a footnote. 
II. Switzerland’s legal and political systems in a nutshell 
A. Switzerland’s legal system  
Switzerland can be described as a federal directorial republic. It is a federation consisting 
of 26 states, which are called “Cantons”.1 The English translation of the Swiss Federal 
Constitution refers to it as the “Swiss Confederation”, which is an adaption of the official 
names in French (Confédération suisse), Italian (Confederazione Svizzera) and Romansh 
(Confederaziun svizra).2 From a public law perspective, however, the term is not 
accurate, as Switzerland is considered a federation rather than a confederation (which it 
used to be until 1848).3 The German name, by the way, is Schweizerische 
Eidgenossenschaft, a historic term meaning something along the lines of “Swiss 
association of those bound together by oath [as opposed to a feudal authority]”. 
The federal government is the Bundesrat (Conseil fédéral, Consiglio federale, 
Cussegl federal), which will be hereinafter referred to as “Federal Council”, a college of 
seven ministers who jointly exercise the powers of the head of state and government. The 
  
1 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 1 (translation: Federal Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation) as per the semi-official translation on <http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19995395/index.html>. 
2 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 1  (translation: Federal Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation) as per the semi-official translation on <http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/19995395/index.html>. 
3 Andreas Kley Historisches Lexikon der Schweiz/Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse (online ed, 2014) 
Bundesstaat <http://www.hls-dhs-dss.ch/textes/d/D9801.php> (translation: Historic Encyclopaedia of 
Switzerland ... Federation). 
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Federal parliament elects the Federal Councillors for a term of office of four years.4 
There is no possibility of impeachment or removal. It is even very rare that Federal 
Councillors are refused re-election: It happened only four times since the establishment 
of the Federal Council in 1848.5 
The Federal parliament is the Bundesversammlung (Assemblée fédérale, Assemblea 
federale, Assamblea federala), which will be hereinafter referred to as “Federal 
Assembly”. It comprises two chambers, the Nationalrat (Conseil national, Consiglio 
nazionale, Cussegl naziunal; hereinafter: “National Council”) and the Ständerat (Conseil 
des Etats, Consiglio degli Stati, Cussegl dals chantuns; hereinafter: “Council of States”). 
In the National Council, which comprises a total of 200 members, the number of each 
Canton’s representatives corresponds to its population, whereas in the Council of State, in 
principle, each Canton is represented by two members. For historic reasons though, six 
Cantons are only allowed to elect one State Councillor. Both chambers are of equal 
standing.6 
The law-making powers lie with the Federal Assembly and the people. Federal 
legislation has to pass the following hurdles: Amendments of the constitution must first 
be approved by both the National Council and the Council of States. Then both the 
majority of the people and the majority of the Cantons must approve them in a public 
vote.7 A Federal act must be approved by both the National Council and the Council of 
States. The act is submitted to a vote of the people if 50,000 persons who are eligible to 
vote or eight Cantons request it within 100 days of the official publication of the 
enactment.8 This is referred to as “optional referendum” and does not require the 
approval of the majority of the Cantons. 
  
4 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 175 (translation: Federal Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation). 
5 See Wikipedia „Swiss Federal Council election“ <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Federal_Council_Switzer-
land _election>. 
6 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 148(2) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). 
7 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 140(1)(a) and 142(2) (translation: 
Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). 
8 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 141(1) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). 
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Each of the Cantons has its own written constitution, its own government, parliament 
and courts. The Cantonal governments are called either Executive Council or Council of 
State. Similar to the Federal Council, they are organised as a college of five or seven 
ministers jointly heading the administration. Other than the Federal Council however, the 
people elect the Cantonal governments directly. 
B. Switzerland’s political system  
Switzerland has a multi-party system with four parties reaching an electoral share over 
10% and seven parties ranking over 5% (both as per the last federal election in 2011). 
The four most popular parties have been in that position for more than fifty years. The 
highest electoral share one single party ever reached since the principle of proportional 
representation was established in 1919 were the 28.9% of votes received by the the right-
wing Schweizerische Volkspartei (SVP)9 in 2007. 
The Federal Assembly usually elects the Federal Councillors out of these four parties 
according to their electoral share. Thus, for more than fifty years the Swiss Federation 
has been governed by a (loose) coalition of the same four biggest parties.  
The same holds true for the Cantons in the sense that their governments are not 
composed by the winner of the election. Given that the people elect the Cantonal 
governments, the composition of the governments reflects the electoral share of the 
parties in the respective Canton. 
C. Switzerland’s federalism  
The Swiss Constitution provides a division of powers between the Federation and the 
Cantons: „The Confederation shall fulfil the duties that are assigned to it by Federal 
Constitution“.10 The duties of the Federation are enumerated in the Swiss Constitution in 
articles 54 through 135. Any matter not mentioned therein falls into the power of the 
Cantons. 
  
9 Translation: Swiss People’s Party. 
10 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 42(1) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation) as per the semi-official translation on 
<http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html>. 
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Usually, the implementation of Federal law is a task of the Cantons.11 Exceptions 
include, inter alia, the military, customs and foreign affairs.  
Federal law takes precedence over any conflicting provision of Cantonal law.12 
III. Structure and powers of the judiciaries  
A. Switzerland’s court structure 
1. The fundamental distinction between public law and private law 
Both the Cantons and the Federation have established their own courts.  
Their scopes of jurisdiction are influenced by the differentiation of public law and 
private law, which is fundamental in Switzerland. Private law is the law governing the 
relationships between individuals (natural persons and organisations). Public law governs 
relationships between individuals and the state. 
Private law is for the most part Federal law, as it has been codified in Federal acts. 
The same holds true for criminal law. In addition, the court proceedings in both private 
law cases and criminal law cases are governed by Federal procedural law. 
Public law is Federal law where the Federation is competent to legislate. Where a 
matter has not been assigned to the Federation for regulation, cantonal law applies.  
Given that the implementation of Federal law is a task of the Cantons, the courts of 
the Cantons often apply Federal law. Most of all, this is true in criminal or private law 
cases where the jurisdiction of the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Patent Court is 
very limited. In contrast, in matters of Federal public law, much more cases are decided 
by the Federal Administrative Court, but still many cases involving Federal public law 
are heard by Cantonal courts. 
  
11 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 46 (translation: Federal Constitution 
of the Swiss Confederation). 
12 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 49(1) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). 
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2. The Federal courts 
Until recently there used to be only one Federal court, the Swiss Federal Supreme Court 
(Bundesgericht, Tribunal fédéral, Tribunale federale, Tribunal federal; hereinafter: 
“Federal Supreme Court”). However, in the course of a major reform of the Federal 
judicature a few years ago some further Federal courts were established: the Federal 
Administrative Court, the Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Patent Court. 
The Federal Criminal Court and the Federal Patent Court were established as 
specialised courts of original jurisdiction.13 
The Federal Administrative Court hears disputes originating in the Federal 
administration.14 It thus acts as a court of appeal with regard to decisions made by the 
Federal administration. 
The Federal Supreme Court is the supreme court of the land. It acts as a final court of 
appeal in all matters of private law and criminal law and in most matters of public law. 
Some exceptions apply with regard to decisions by the Federal Administrative Court.15 
3. The courts of the Cantons 
The court structures of the Cantons are all similar to each other. In all Cantons there are 
courts of lower instance, which hear private law and criminal law cases. These courts are 
usually called District Courts. In some Cantons criminal law cases are brought before a 
specialised Criminal Court.  
All Cantons have established Courts of Appeal having jurisdiction both in private law 
cases and in criminal law cases. 
  
13 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 191a(1) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation); Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Strafbehörden des 
Bundes 2010, art 35 (translation: Federal Act on the Organisation of the Federal Criminal Authorities); 
Bundesgesetz über das Bundespatentgericht 2009, art 1 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Patent 
Court). 
14 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2005, art 1 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal 
Administrative Court). 
15 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 83 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court). 
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As a matter of Federal law16, all Cantons must appoint an administrative court, which 
hears appeals in matters of public law. While some Cantons have established specialised 
Administrative Courts, others have appointed the Courts of Appeal as their administrative 
courts. 
The procedural law applied by the courts of the Cantons is now mostly Federal law, as 
both a Federal Civil Procedure Code and a Federal Criminal Procedure Code were 
enacted in 2011. In public law cases however, the procedure is still a matter of the 
Cantonal law. 
B. New Zealand’s court structure 
There are four courts of general jurisdiction in New Zealand: the District Courts; the 
High Court; the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court. In addition, there are a number 
of specialised courts such as the Family Court, the Youth Court, the Employment Court 
and the Māori Land Court.17 
The New Zealand Supreme Court was created only in 2003. Until then, the final court 
of appeal for New Zealand had been the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, a 
judicial body sitting in London.18 
The Court of Appeal has both civil and criminal appellate jurisdiction. It hears appeals 
from the High Court and, exceptionally, from inferior courts.19 
The High Court enjoys both general original jurisdiction and appellate jurisdiction. In 
the latter role, it hears appeals from the District Courts. The High Court’s original 
jurisdiction includes all matters that fall outside the statutory jurisdiction of the District 
Courts.20 
  
16 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 86(2) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court). 
17 Duncan Webb, Katherine Sanders and Paul Scott The New Zealand Legal System: Structures and 
Processes (5th ed, LexisNexis, Wellington, 2010) at 250. 
18 At 260. 
19 At 265. 
20 At 267. 
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C. The powers of the judiciary 
1. The powers of the Swiss judges 
a) The two forms of judicial powers 
Two forms of powers of the Swiss judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature may be 
distinguished. The first one can be called “judicial review”: the power to review a law in 
concreto, while examining a concrete decision that was rendered applying the law. In 
Swiss legal tradition, a court reviewing a law in concreto does not have the power to 
quash it, but the court may express that it deems the law invalid and accordingly not 
apply it in the case at hand. 
The second power is referred to as “constitutional jurisdiction”: the power of a court 
to review a law in the abstract and quash it, without it being applied in a decision. 
b) The courts of the Cantons and the lower Federal courts 
All Swiss courts may exercise judicial review, in particular examine if a law is in conflict 
with the constitution. This system is called “diffused constitutional jurisdiction”.  
Not all Swiss courts have constitutional jurisdiction, though. In the Cantons, some 
Courts of Appeal act as constitutional courts and may thus, upon appeal by any resident 
of the Canton, quash a law that is in conflict with the constitution or Federal law. In most 
Cantons, though, such constitutional jurisdiction is limited to legislation that was set by 
communal authorities or the Cantonal government, whereas acts of the Cantonal 
parliament are not subject to constitutional jurisdiction by the courts of the Cantons. 
c) The Federal Supreme Court 
As mentioned before, the Federal Supreme Court, in its first function, acts as a final court 
of appeal for any case decided by lower Federal courts or higher Cantonal courts. In its 
second function, the Federal Supreme Court safeguards the supremacy of Federal law 
over Cantonal law. Therefore, the Federal Supreme Court must have constitutional 
jurisdiction on all Cantonal legislation.21 
  
21 See Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 82(2) and 87 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal 
Supreme Court). 
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The Federal Supreme Court does not have constitutional jurisdiction on Federal law 
though. While it is well established that the Federal Supreme Court may review all kinds 
of federal legislation, the court must apply Federal acts even if they are in conflict with 
the constitution. This is provided in art 190 of the Swiss Constitution: “The Federal 
Supreme Court and the other judicial authorities apply the federal acts and international 
law.”22 
The question arises which should in case of conflict prevail: Federal acts or 
international law. The constitution provides no answer. The Federal Supreme Court 
traditionally held that international law in principle should prevail, as it must be assumed 
that the legislator intended to comply with Switzerland’s international obligations. An 
exception applies, however, if the legislator intentionally enacted a Federal law that is in 
conflict with international law. This principle was established in the famous Schubert 
case.23 There is a counter-exception to Schubert, though: In a number of recent cases the 
Federal Supreme Court held that international law must prevail in cases where the 
international law is aimed at the protection of human rights (such as the European 
Convention on Human Rights).24 Whether it extends to other international treaties 
remains unclear. 
2. The powers of the New Zealand judges 
The High Court inherits the inherent jurisdiction and powers of the courts of common law 
and equity in England. Among those is the power to ensure that public bodies act within 
the boundaries set by law.25 This is called “judicial review”, as far as the validity of 
delegated legislation is concerned.26 Traditionally, as a matter of Parliamentary 
sovereignty, courts do not have the power to review Acts of Parliament.27 In recent times, 
  
22 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 190 (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation) as per the semi-official translation on 
<http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html>. 
23 See Schubert v Canton of Ticino [1973] 99 Ib BGE/ATF 39. 
24 See A v Federal Council [1999] 125 II BGE/ATF 417; Eidgenössische Zollverwaltung v X [2012] 138 II 
BGE/ATF 524. 
25 Webb, Sanders and Scott, above n 17, at 267. 
26 At 87. 
27 At 125 and 131. 
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though, two eminent judges indicated in extra-judicial statements some scepticism 
towards the idea of completely unrestrained powers of Parliament.28 Nevertheless, the 
doctrine of Parliamentary sovereignty continues to be the prevailing view. 
IV. Appointment of judges 
This paper will now examine and compare how judicial appointments are made in 
Switzerland and New Zealand. To that end, this paper will first examine the requirements 
in legislation to be a judge and the question of who is granted the power to make the 
appointments. The paper will then set out the criteria following which judges are selected 
from the pool of candidates before finally turning to two topics deserving a separate 
treatment: each country’s stance on appointment boards and on political influence.  
A. Who is eligible to be a judge? 
1. Who is eligible to be a Swiss judge? 
The formal requirements to be a Federal court judge are scant: Any person eligible to 
vote, that is to say: anyone over the age of 18 who is not incapacitated, may be appointed 
as Federal court judge.29  
In some Cantons, for instance in the Canton of Zurich, eligibility to vote is the sole 
formal requirement to be a judge as well. However, a law degree or even a bar exam is in 
many Cantons required from full-time judges, from presiding judges or from judges of 
courts of appeal. In the Canton of Aargau, which recently reformed its law on the 
organisation of the judiciary, the presiding judges of the District Courts and the judges of 
the Court of Appeal must meet a higher threshold: They must both hold a bar exam and 
have been working as a lawyer for five years. In the Canton of Fribourg/Freiburg, full-
time judges must have a law degree and sufficient practical experience. In other Cantons, 
such as the Cantons of Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft, only the presiding judges are 
required to hold a law degree. Only two Cantons, Lucerne and Zug, require all judges to 
hold a law degree. 
  
28 At 131. 
29 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 5(2) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court). 
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Lay judges are therefore still common in many Cantons. Historically, the introduction 
of lay judges in Europe was a product of the Enlightenment meant to counterbalance the 
legally educated judges who were appointed by the monarchs. In Switzerland however it 
had for the most part been due to the fact that academically trained lawyers were for a 
long time scant in rural regions.30 
Typically, lay judges will only be part of a panel of judges, together with judges 
holding a law degree. It may happen though that a lay judge must act as a single judge as 
was the case in X v Canton of Thurgau, where both the president and the vice-president of 
the district court had recused themselves.31 The Federal Supreme Court held that to have 
a case adjudicated by a lay judge is not in violation of the right to a fair trial as long as a 
trained law clerk participates in the management of the proceedings and the decision-
making.32 The court noted that in the concerned Canton of Thurgau—as in many other 
Cantons—the law clerk may actively participate in the deliberations on the judgment.33  
2. Who is eligible to be a New Zealand judge? 
In New Zealand, the formal requirements for judges are considerably stricter. High Court 
judges must have held a practising certificate as a barrister or solicitor for at least seven 
years.34 The same rule applies to District Court judges who, however, are also eligible if 
they have been continuously employed as an officer of the responsible department or 
Ministry of Justice for a period of at least 10 years, and during that period have been 
employed for not less than 7 years as the Clerk or Registrar of a court, and are a barrister 
or solicitor who has been qualified for admission, or admitted, as such for not less than 7 
years.35  
Court of Appeal judges as well as Supreme Court judges are required to be appointed 
as judges of the High Court and must therefore satisfy the same conditions.36 
  
30 X v Canton of Thurgau [2007] 134 I BGE/ATF 16 at 18. 
31 At 16. 
32 At 19. 
33 At 19. 
34 Judicature Act 1908 s 6. 
35 District Courts Act 1947 s 5(3). 
36 Judicature Act 1908, s 57; Supreme Court Act 2003 s 20. 
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3. The Swiss debate on lay judges 
There is no denying that lawyers are better suited for the bench than lay judges. Just 
recently, a newly elected lay judge came to realise after having been acting as a judge for 
some months that he did not meet the standards that he himself expected a judge to 
fulfil.37 Those in favour of lay judges usually argue that they bring common sense and 
experience of life to the courts and that they may add a different professional experience. 
A further argument that is put forward is that the judiciary as one of the three state 
powers should not be restricted to one profession only.38 These arguments are however 
simply testament to widespread prejudices of lawyers living in an ivory tower. While a 
court may indeed benefit from having access to professional experience gained outside 
the legal profession, a judge must first and foremost have sound knowledge of the law 
and the experience of applying it. Any other professional experience or experience of life, 
as enriching as it may be, can never replace the legal expertise. While these further 
experiences may sometimes help finding the right answers, only legal experience enables 
the judges to ask themselves the right questions. 
4. Jury trials 
The popularity of lay judges in Switzerland contrasts sharply with the abolition of jury 
trials. Until 2010, all but four Cantons had already abolished jury trials. Three more did 
so when adapting their legislation on the judiciary to the new Federal procedure codes. 
Only the Canton of Ticino in a public vote decided to hold on to some variation of jury 
courts (mixed panels of lawyers and lay members, with a majority of lay members).39  
New Zealand on the other hand still offers to the parties of a trial the option of having 
their dispute adjudicated by a jury. This applies both to the accused person in criminal 
trials where the maximum penalty is three month’s imprisonment or more and to the 
  
37 Brigitte Hürlimann “Der Polizist will nicht mehr richten” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (16 May 2014) at 15 
(translation: “The policeman does not want to be a judge anymore”). 
38 Beat Grossrieder and Dominique Strebel “Justiz: Die Laien sterben langsam aus” Beobachter 
<http://www.beobachter.ch/justiz-behoerde/buerger-verwaltung/artikel/justiz_die-laien-sterben-langsam-
aus/> (translation: “Judiciary: The laypersons are dying out”). 
39 Peter Jankovsky “Das Tessinervolk redet vor Gericht mit” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (13 December 2011) at 
14 (translation: “The people of Ticino have their say in court”). 
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parties to a civil case where the amount claimed or the value of the chattel in dispute 
exceeds $3,000.40 Jurors are mostly laypersons, as both judges and practising lawyers are 
disqualified from sitting on juries.41 In this way, juries ensure that a range of perspectives, 
experiences and knowledge are brought to bear in the decision-making and that 
contemporary community values are reflected in the decisions of the courts.42 
It is submitted that lay judges and jurors serve a similar purpose: They both satisfy the 
people’s need to be judged by their peers on the basis of contemporary community 
values.43 
5. The role of law clerks 
Due to the popularity of lay judges in Switzerland, law clerks play an important role in 
the Swiss judiciary. In German they are called “Gerichtsschreiber” (literally: “court 
writer”), in French and Italian “gréffier” (“recording clerk”) and “cancelliere” 
(“chancellor”).44 They are required to hold a law degree and many of them are admitted 
to the bar.  
Historically, many judges were not lawyers. Until the 19th century, especially in rural 
regions, law clerks were very often the only lawyers at courts.45 Writing the reasons for 
the judgment was therefore an important task of the law clerks, as the judges as laymen 
were often not capable to write legally correct judgments.46 In many Cantons, law clerks 
participate in the deliberations of the judges, where they may submit motions or counter-
  
40 Judicature Act 1908, s 19A. 
41 Webb, Sanders and Scott, above n 17, at 293. 
42 Law Commission Delivering Justice For All: A Vision for New Zealand Court and Tribunals (R85 2004) 
at 181. 
43 See Webb, Sanders and Scott, above n 17, at 293. 
44 Stefan Heimgartner “Der Richter und sein Schreiber” in Marianne Heer and others (eds) Toujours agité - 
jamais abattu: Festschrift für Hans Wiprächtiger (Helbing Lichtenhahn, Basel, 2011) 295 at 297 
(translation: “The judge and his clerk” in Always agitated - never disheartened: Festsschrift for Hans 
Wiprächtiger). The title of this text is a reference to Friedrich Dürrenmatt’s famous novel “Der Richter und 
sein Henker” (“The judge and his hangman”). 
45 See Simon Netzle “Der Gerichtsschreiber - mehr Gericht als Schreiber?” 
<www.gerichtsschreiber.ch/pdf/geschichtliches.pdf> (translation: “The Court Clerk - more Court than 
Clerk?”). 
46 Heimgartner, above n 44, at 298. 
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motions as to the court’s decision. This is referred to as law clerks having “beratende 
Stimme” (“voix consultative”, “voto consultivo”, “advisory vote”) in the deliberations.47 
All Acts on Federal courts contain identical provisions on law clerks (or court clerks, 
as they are referred to in the English translations of these Acts), which provide, as in the 
example of the Federal Act on the Federal Patent Court:48  
1 Court clerks take part in case briefings and in making decisions. They act in an 
advisory capacity. 
2 They draft proposals under the supervision of a judge and edit the decisions of the 
Federal Patent Court. 
Given that the time-consuming task of writing judgments mainly lies with the law 
clerks, and not the judges, Swiss courts often employ more law clerks than judges. While 
there are currently 57 judges at the Federal Supreme Court, the same court employs 141 
law clerks.49 122 of them are admitted to the bar, 49 of them hold a doctorate and three 
are professors of law. 
In some Cantons, law clerks are even allowed to act in place of judges in some 
respects, for instance in matters of urgency.50 In the Canton of Basel-Landschaft, for 
example, some law clerks at the Court of Appeal are empowered to grant provisional 
measures in lieu of judges. In the Canton of Valais/Wallis, law clerks may substitute 
district court judges.51 
In New Zealand, law clerks, or judges’ clerks, as they are sometimes referred to,52 
have a different role, one often described as “research assistant”.53 Rather than working 
  
47 See X v Canton of Thurgau [2007] BGE 134 I 16 (Federal Supreme Court) at 19. 
48 Bundesgesetz über das Bundespatentgericht 2009, art 24 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Patent 
Court) as per the semi-official translation on <www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/20071763/index.html>; see also Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 24 
(translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme Court); Bundesgesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht 
2005, art 26 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Administrative Court); Bundesgesetz über die 
Organisation der Strafbehörden des Bundes 2010, art 59 (translation: Federal Act on the Organisation of the 
Federal Criminal Justice Authorities). 
49 See Federal Supreme Court “Richter und Personal” <www.bger.ch/index/federal/federal-inherit-
template/federal-richter.htm> (translation: "Judges and personnel"). 
50 Heimgartner, above n 44, at 302. 
51 At 302. 
52 Thomas Gibbons “The rise of Judges’ Clerks” [2002] NZLJ 136 at 136. 
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for the court in general and being assigned to cases, they are assigned to one particular 
judge (or, in case of inferior courts, to some judges). Their task is, in principle, not to 
write the judgments but to carry out the research for the judges in order to enable them to 
write their judgments. Nevertheless, some authors believe that New Zealand law clerks 
play a larger role than is sometimes admitted.54 
B. Who appoints the judges? 
1. Who appoints the judges in New Zealand? 
In New Zealand, the appointment procedures are governed by constitutional conventions 
rather than statutory law.55 The Attorney-General who is for the most part responsible for 
the appointments enjoys therefore a certain freedom to design the procedure. 
Accordingly, different Attorney-Generals have adopted different procedures.56 
The procedures to appoint District Court Judges and High Court Judges are, while not 
identical in every respect, by and large very similar. They both consist of four phases: 
First, prospective candidates submit expressions of interest either of their own or upon 
public advertisements or upon specific invitation after wide consultation. Second, a 
longlist is produced and submitted to the Attorney-General. Third, the Attorney-General, 
after such consultation as deemed necessary and, when appointing High Court Judges, 
with the agreement of the Chief Justice, decides who is to be on the shortlist for 
interviews. Fourth, after the interviews and reputation checks, the Attorney-General 
selects a candidate, mentions the appointment in Cabinet and tenders formal advice to the 
Governor-General.57  
In both appointment procedures, the legal establishment is consulted before the 
appointment: For High Court Judges, the Solicitor-General, before producing the longlist, 
                                                                                                                                            
53 At 136. 
54 At 136. 
55 Law Commission Review of the Judicature Act 1908: Towards a new Courts Act (R126 2012) at [5.10]–
[5.15]. 
56 John McGrath “Appointing the Judiciary” [1998] The New Zealand Law Journal 314 at 314. 
57 See Ministry of Justice Judicial Appointments: Office of District Court Judge (2012) at 6; Crown Law 
Office Judicial Appointments Protocol (Crown Law Office, 2014) at 4–5. 
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consults with senior judges;58 for District Court Judges, the President of the Law Society 
is consulted.59 
Formally, the power to appoint the judges in New Zealand is vested in the Governor-
General60 who by convention acts on advise of the Attorney-General61 (or, in some cases, 
of the Prime Minister62 or the Minister of Maori Affairs63). De facto however, it is not the 
Governor-General but the advisor (that is, apart from the noted exceptions, the Attorney-
General) who takes the decision. 
Appointments to the Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court occur typically through 
judicial promotion from the High Court and the Court of Appeal.64 
2. Who appoints the judges in Switzerland? 
In the Swiss Federation there is a similar, though not identical, disparity between who 
selects the candidates to be appointed and who finally appoints them. While the Federal 
Assembly elects all Federal court judges65, the elections are prepared by the Judiciary 
Committee66 (Gerichtskommission, Commission judiciaire, Commissione giudiziaria, 
Cumissiun giudiziala), which usually selects one of the candidates and advises the 
  
58 Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 4. 
59 Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 6. 
60 See Judicature Act 1908 s 4(2) and 57(2); Supreme Court Act 2003 s 17(1)(b). 
61 Law Commission, above n 55, at [512–513]; Philip A Joseph “Appointment, discipline and removal of 
judges in New Zealand” in HP Lee (ed) Judiciaries in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2011) 66 at 67. 
62 Appointment of the Chief Justice: see Law Commission, above n 55, at [5.11]. 
63 Appointment of the judges of the Maori Land Court: see Joseph, above n 61, at 67–68. 
64 Joseph, above n 61, at 69. 
65 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 5(1) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court); Bundesgesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2005, art 5(1) (translation: Federal Act on the 
Federal Administrative Court); Bundesgesetz über das Bundespatentgericht 2009, art 9(1) (translation: 
Federal Act on the Federal Patent Court); Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Strafbehörden des 
Bundes 2010, art 42(1) (translation: Federal Act on the Organisation of the Federal Criminal Justice 
Authorities). 
66 See Bundesgesetz über die Bundesversammlung 2002 , art 40a (translation: Federal Act on the Federal 
Assembly) as per the semi-official translation on <http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-
compilation/20010664/index.html>. 
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Federal Assembly to elect this candidate.67 The Judiciary Committee is a select 
committee of the Federal Assembly and accordingly comprises members of both 
chambers of parliament. Pursuant to art 40a(5) of the Bundesgesetz über die 
Bundesversammlung68, each parliamentary group69 has the right to at least one seat on the 
Committee. Of the 17 members of the Committee, 5 are Councillors of States and 12 are 
National Councillors. 
The Federal Assembly has so far never refused to elect the candidate chosen by the 
commission.  
The Federal Supreme Court was established as the Supreme Court of Switzerland in 
1849 in the first Swiss Federal Constitution 1848. Article 96 thereof provided that the 
members of the Federal Supreme Court are elected by the Federal Assembly. When the 
Swiss Federal Constitution 1848 was revised entirely and replaced by the Swiss Federal 
Constitution 1874, this provision was adopted without change in art 107(1) of the new 
constitution.  
The Swiss Federal Constitution was revised entirely for the second time in the 1990s 
and replaced by the Swiss Federal Constitution 1999. No changes were made to the 
procedure of appointment of the judges of the Federal Supreme Court: Article 168(1) 
states that they are elected by the Federal Assembly. The rationale of this system 
mentioned in the travaux préparatoires is what presumably was the original reason for 
establishing it in the 19th century: The Federal Assembly has always been perceived as 
the supreme federal authority (subject to the rights of the people and the cantons)70 and 
was therefore appointed to elect all the other highest federal authorities.71 
  
67 Bundesgesetz über die Bundesversammlung 2002, art 40a(1)-(3) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal 
Assembly). 
68 Bundesgesetz über die Bundesversammlung 2002 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Assembly). 
69 Parliamentary groups are composed of the Councillors of one party. A parliamentary group must consist 
of a minimum of five members. Members of smaller parties may form their own parliamentary groups or 
join a bigger party’s group. 
70 See Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 148(1) (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation). 
71 Bundesrat Botschaft über eine neue Bundesverfassung (BBl 1997 1) at 395 (translation: Federal Council 
Report on a new Federal Constitution). 
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When in Switzerland several new federal courts were established, the Federal Council 
first proposed to appoint the required judges.72 In a statement, the Federal Supreme 
Court, noting that the new federal courts were to review acts by the Federal 
administration, for which ultimately the Federal Council was responsible, criticised this 
proposal in no uncertain terms: “Die Wahl durch den Bundesrat ist verfassungsrechtlich 
bedenklich und daher abzulehnen.”73 (“The election by the Federal Council is 
questionable under constitutional law and should be rejected”). The law commission of 
the Council of States agreed with the Federal Supreme Court.74  
Two reasons were crucial for having the parliament appoint the judges instead of the 
government: The first one, which was mentioned by the Federal Supreme Court, is the 
separation of powers, which might be in danger if the judges were to review acts of those 
who are in charge of re-electing them. While this reason was certainly important in the 
recent debate, it does not explain why judges at courts that are not competent to perform 
such review are nevertheless not appointed by the government either. The second reason 
is therefore even more important; it is one deeply rooted in the Swiss concept of the state: 
As the judiciary is a power separate from the legislative and the government, its authority 
must be underpinned by what is called “demokratische Legitimation” (democratic 
legitimacy).75 The authority of any public official depends on the degree of their 
democratic legitimacy, which is strongest where an official is elected by the people. An 
official’s democratic legitimacy is weakened when the appointment was made by the 
parliament (and thus indirectly by the people) and it is perceived as even weaker when 
the official is appointed by the government. This point is illustrated by Councillor 
Schmid’s statement in the course of the recent debate that if the new federal courts were 
  
72 Bundesamt für Justiz Funktion der Gerichtskommission der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung 
Vorbereitung von Richterwahlen (VPB (2003) 69.3) at ch I2.a (translation: Federal Office of Justice 
Function of the Justice Commission of the Federal Assembly Preparation of Elections of Judges). 
73 Bundesgericht Stellungnahme des Bundesgerichts vom 23. Februar 2001 (BBl 2001 5890) at 5892–5893 
(translation: Federal Supreme Court Statement of the Federal Supreme Court of 23 February 2001). 
74 Bundesamt für Justiz, above n 72, at ch I2.b. 
75 Regina Kiener “Richterwahlen in der Schweiz” [2002] 71 Betrifft JUSTIZ 378 at 378 (translation: 
“Elections of Judges in Switzerland”) 
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supposed to be real courts, then, pursuant to the rationale of the Swiss concept of state, 
the judges had to be elected by the people or the parliament, not the government.76  
A different light was shed on the issue in 2001 by Councillor Schmid during a 
parliamentary debate on the introduction of a justice appointment board. Councillor 
Schmid stated that supreme court judges should not be appointed purely based on 
expertise because they were not apolitical robots but instead shaped actively the politics 
to the highest extent.77 He feared that an appointment board would always choose judges 
with a preference of constitutional rights over democratic rights.78 In other words, he was 
afraid of what is in New Zealand referred to as judicial activism. While this fear of 
judicial activism was not the original reason for having the parliament elect the federal 
judges at the time the Federal Supreme Court was established, it is now presumably one 
of the main reasons for upholding the system. 
In New Zealand, that very same fear is perceived as a possible root of over-
politicization of the appointment process.79  
In the Cantons, usually a distinction is made between the judges at the lower courts 
and the courts of appeal. The most common system provides that court of appeal judges 
are elected by the parliament, whereas the lower court judges are elected by the people of 
their district of jurisdiction. However, there are still eight Cantons where even the judges 
of the higher courts are elected by the people. 
The judges at courts of first instance are in most Cantons elected by the people.80 
Exceptions include the Cantons of Ticino, Nidwalden, Schaffhausen, Lucerne and Bern, 
where the parliament elects all the judges of the Canton. The Canton of Bern adopted this 
rule only recently in a law reform of 2009. 
  
76 Carlo Schmid (6 December 2001) Amtliches Bulletin des Ständerates at 910 (translation: Official 
Protocol of the debates of the Council of States). 
77 At 911. 
78 At 911. 
79 See James Allan “Judicial Appointments in New Zealand: if it were done when ’tis done, then ’twere 
well it were done openly and directly” in Kate Malleson and Peter H Russell (eds) Appointing Judges in an 
Age of Judicial Power: Critical Perspectives from around the World (University of Toronto Press, Toronto, 
2006) 103 at 109–110. 
80 Kiener, above n 75, at 378. 
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The procedures followed in the Cantons resemble the Federal course of action as far 
as appointments by the parliaments are concerned. In contrast, the same can of course not 
be said of elections by the people. Those are typically controlled by the parties. Often the 
parties will prior to the election confer with each other and distribute the vacancies 
among the parties according to their electoral share. In the Canton of Zurich for instance 
this is a task of the Interparteiliche Konferenz (“inter-party conference”), which also 
examines the candidates’ suitability and then publishes an “official” proposal of 
candidates. Contested elections occur therefore only rarely, when the parties are unable to 
come to an agreement or when a political outsider challenges the official candidates.  
Where the judges are elected by the people, the parties are naturally strongly 
involved. Unless candidates are supported by a party, they will find it very difficult to 
raise enough attention and to be sufficiently well-known to the electorate. The 
information on the candidates given to the public is usually scarce: Typically, it merely 
includes the candidate’s age, civil status, education and professional career. With few 
exceptions, there are no campaigns for or against judges.81 
As mentioned above, the judges, through their election by the people or the 
parliament, enjoy a higher authority, or democratic legitimacy as it were, than they would 
if they were appointed by the government.  
Presumably for the same reason it is in New Zealand the Governor-General, the 
official representative of the Crown in New Zealand, who finally makes the appointment, 
and not the Attorney-General who, while de facto being in charge of the decision, 
formally only tenders advice to the Governor-General. An appointment by the Governor-
General and thus by the Crown itself must give a judge a higher standing than the 
appointment by a government officer would.  
C. By which criteria are judges selected? 
The criteria by which judges are selected are typically not stated in legislation. This is 
true both for New Zealand and Switzerland, and in particular for Swiss Federal court 
  
81 But see, for an exception, the case of Klee v Liberal-Democratic Party of the District of Werdenberg 
[1976] 102 Ia BGE/ATF 264, where a judge who was not re-elected complained about a pamphlet that 
criticised him harshly. 
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judges. Nevertheless, the criteria are no secret. In its 2006 report, the Judiciary 
Committee informed about the criteria applied in appointing the Federal Administrative 
Court judges. It explained that the first and most important criterion was the professional 
expertise of the candidates, the second criterion the adequate representation of the official 
languages and the third the political attitude of the candidates.82  
This is however somewhat misleading when it comes to the criterion of the political 
attitude of a particular candidate. While it certainly is not the sole criterion applied by the 
Judiciary Committee and the Federal Assembly, it is still of paramount importance: There 
has not been elected a politically independent Federal Supreme Court judge since Logoz J 
in 1942.83 
Currently, there are 57 judges at the Federal Supreme Court, 19 of them in a part-time 
job. Of the 38 full-time judges, three are Italian-speaking, twelve French-speaking and 23 
German-speaking. Given that about 23% of the Swiss population is French-speaking and 
about 6% Italian-speaking, the distribution of the languages seems adequate.84 
As most of the Cantons are monolingual (the exceptions being the four Cantons of 
Bern/Berne, Fribourg/Freiburg, Wallis/Valais and Graubünden/Grigioni/Grischun), the 
language is rarely a criterion for judges at the courts of the Cantons. As far as the judges 
are elected by the parliaments, this leaves the candidates’ professional expertise and their 
political attitude as determinant factors. Where the judges are elected by the people, the 
criteria applied by each individual must of course remain obscure. 
In New Zealand, too, the criteria of appointment are nowadays well known even 
though they are not stated in legislation. The Law Commission published in 2012 a 
comprehensive report on New Zealand’s present system of judicial appointments, in 
  
82 Gerichtskommission Vorbereitung der Wahlen an das Bundesverwaltungsgericht (2006) at 4 (translation: 
Judiciary Committee Preparation of the elections of the Federal Administrative Court Judges) 
<www.parlament.ch/d/organe-mitglieder/kommissionen/weitere-kommissionen/ gerichtskommission/ 
Documents/gk-rueckblick-2011-2013-d.pdf>. 
83 Markus Felber “Problematische Kür der Richter in der Schweiz” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (31 December 
2009) at 11 (translation: Troublesome election of judges in Switzerland). 
84 Only 0.7% of the Swiss population are Romansh-speaking. So far, two Federal Supreme Court judges 
have been Romansh-speaking and one decision of the Federal Supreme Court has been rendered in 
Romansh (Corporaziun da vaschins da Scuol v Regenza dal chantun Grischun [1996] 122 I BGE/ATF 93). 
25 Suter – Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges 
 
which it recommended enacting statutory criteria.85 The then Minister of Justice however 
did not support said recommendation. Instead, she proposed to require the Attorney-
General “to produce public guidelines or protocols outlining the process to be followed 
when he or she solicits and advances judicial appointment recommendations to the 
Governor-General”.86 The Attorney-General agreed with this proposal and published two 
booklets setting out the process for appointing judges of District Courts and Higher 
Courts.87 
While the proceedings for appointments of District Court judges and Higher Court 
judges may differ, the candidates are assessed based on largely identical sets of criteria, 
which cover four categories: legal ability, qualities of character, personal technical skills 
and reflection of society.88  
Legal ability includes a sound knowledge of the law and experience of its application. 
The candidate must have demonstrated overall excellence as a lawyer in a relevant legal 
occupation.89 Qualities of character sought are, among others, personal honesty and 
integrity, open mindedness and impartiality, social sensitivity, common sense and the 
ability to work hard.90 Certain personal technical skills are deemed important, which 
comprise, inter alia, effective communication with both lay people and lawyers, the 
ability to deal with complex material and organisational skills.91 In terms of reflection of 
society judges are expected to be aware of, and sensitive to, the diversity of modern New 
Zealand society (including tikanga Māori and Te Reo), have experience of the 
community of which the court is part and demonstrate their social awareness.92 
All these criteria are included to assess a candidate’s suitability to be a judge. Clearly, 
this catalogue of criteria is the result of considerable efforts to determine the qualities that 
  
85 Law Commission, above n 55, at 57. 
86 Office of the Minister of Justice Government response to the Law Commission’s report “Review of the 
Judicature Act 1908: towards a new Courts Act” (2013) at [31]. 
87 Ministry of Justice, above n 57; Crown Law Office, above n 57. 
88 See Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 3–4; Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 5. 
89 See Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 3–4; Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 5. 
90 See Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 4; Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 5. 
91 See Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 4; Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 5. 
92 See Crown Law Office, above n 57, at 4; Ministry of Justice, above n 57, at 5. 
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a good judge should have. It is equally clear that all the actors involved in the 
appointment process have the ambition to seek out the best possible candidate. 
This is not the case in Switzerland, where there is no evidence that the authorities 
preparing or making judicial appointments have made sufficient effort to determine the 
necessary qualities of a judge.  
D. The take on appointment boards 
Introducing appointment boards was recently discussed in both jurisdictions. When in 
Switzerland several new federal courts were established, the Federal Council first 
proposed to appoint the judges because it found that the Federal Assembly were hardly 
capable to evaluate and appoint the required number of roughly 100 judges.93 The law 
commission of the Council of States rejected this unanimously because of concerns with 
the separation of powers. It instead suggested establishing a justice commission as an 
extra-parliamentary body comprising legal scholars, judges and barristers, which would 
submit proposals to the Federal Assembly.94 
In the parliamentary debate in the Council of States however the Councillors preferred 
establishing a parliamentary justice commission instead, approving a motion of 
Councillor Schmid.95 Schmid argued that the proposals of an extra-parliamentary body 
would have too much weight due to that body’s expertise. The Federal Assembly would 
be hard pressed not to follow the proposals.96 Given that supreme court judges actively 
shaped politics, the appointment needed to be at the discretion of the Federal Assembly.97 
Fellow Councillor Schiesser added that the Federal Assembly should be both factually 
and legally accountable for the appointments, which it would not be if the candidates 
were evaluated by an extra-parliamentary body.98 Thus, the parliament subsequently 
installed a new parliamentary commission, the Judiciary Committee. 
  
93 Bundesamt für Justiz, above n 72, at ch I2.a. 
94 At ch I2.b. 
95 See Schmid, above n 76, at 910–912. 
96 Bundesamt für Justiz, above n 72, at ch I2.c. 
97 Schmid, above n 76, at 911. 
98 Fritz Schiesser (6 December 2001) Amtliches Bulletin des Ständerates at 914 (translation: Official 
Protocol of the debates of the Council of States). 
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Similar to the Federation, the Cantons have almost unanimously rejected the idea of 
appointment boards. However, two French-speaking Cantons have adopted institutions 
that come close to appointment boards: In the bilingual Canton of Fribourg/Freiburg, a 
Justice Council (“Justizrat”/“Conseil de la magistrature”) was established, which is 
composed of nine members: one member each of the parliament and the government, two 
judges, one professor of the local university, one public prosecutor, one attorney and two 
members to be proposed by the Council itself. One of the tasks of the Council is to 
prepare judicial appointments: It will, inter alia, assess all the candidates and report to the 
parliament, which then elects the judges.99 
The Conseil supérieur de la magistrature100 of the Canton of Geneva, which consists 
mainly of members of the judiciary and the legal profession, has similar functions. It 
prepares judicial appointments by reporting on its evaluation of the candidates’ 
expertise.101 Nevertheless, the bottom line is that neither the Federation nor any of the 
Cantons have granted the power to appoint judges to an appointment board. 
New Zealand, too, has recently discussed and rejected the idea of establishing a 
judicial appointment board, for reasons that are not entirely different from those in 
Switzerland. One of the main concerns that were expressed in the discussion was that 
accountability would be diffused and thus shifted away from the one responsible for the 
appointment.102 This, however, is also where the similarities end. In New Zealand it was 
criticised that such a board might end up enabling rather than eliminating political 
influence on appointments due to its members being selected in a political process103 or 
due to the Attorney-General being able to choose for political reasons between the 
candidates approved by the board.104 
  
99 Loi sur la justice du canton de Fribourg 2010/Justizgesetz des Kantons Freiburg 2010, art 12 (translation: 
Act on the judiciary of the Canton of Fribourg). 
100 Translation: Supreme Council of the Judicial Magistrature. 
101 Constitution de la République et canton de Genève 2012, art 127 (translation: Constitution of the 
Republic and Canton of Geneva). 
102 See Geoffrey Palmer “Judicial Selection and Accountability: Can the New Zealand System Survive?” in 
B D Gray and R B McClintock (eds) Courts and Policy: Checking the Balance (Brooker’s, Wellington, 
1995) 11 at 82–83; Allan, above n 79, at 116. 
103 Palmer, above n 102, at 82. 
104 Allan, above n 79, at 116. 
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There is, in this author’s opinion, some truth to these arguments. If one assumes for 
the sake of argument that there is something wrong with a member of government 
appointing the judges, then how would that be remedied by an appointment board? 
Installing an appointment board will only shift the issue from “who appoints the judges?” 
to “who appoints those who appoint the judges?” without substantially altering the issue. 
At the same time, the accountability of the Attorney-General would partly be shifted to 
the appointment board. Being able to choose from candidates cleared by the board, the 
Attorney-General would presumably enjoy a considerable freedom in selecting a 
preferred candidate for inappropriate reasons. 
It is submitted that appointment boards make sense where they tender advice because 
those appointing the judges are in need of said advice for lack of relevant experience. 
This is the case in Switzerland. Another scenario where appointment boards may be a 
sensible choice is where they make the appointments themselves. Certainly, the 
advantages and disadvantages of this scenario are inevitably highly dependent on how the 
board is composed and how its members are appointed. Nevertheless, there is something 
to be said for the view that, if composed prudently, they may be more representative of 
the society and more visibly politically neutral or neutralised. 
E. The take on political influence 
In Switzerland, on the other hand, the prevailing fear was that installing an appointment 
board would diminish political influence. Switzerland openly embraces a highly 
politicised appointment procedure.  
The appointments are prepared by the Judiciary Committee, which is composed of 
members of both chambers of the Federal Assembly. Both the Committee and the Federal 
Assembly aim at the political parties being represented at the Federal Supreme Court 
according to their electoral share. In case of a vacancy at a federal court, the Committee 
publishes job advertisements in the major newspapers and informs the political parties.105 
The Committee then reviews the applicants. It must take into account the applicants’ 
  
105 Bundesgesetz über die Bundesversammlung 2002 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Assembly), 
art 40a(2). 
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professional expertise as well as social and political aspects.106 It will usually select one 
of the candidates and present its proposal to the political parties. Having regard to their 
feedback, the Committee then submits its recommendation to the Federal Assembly. 
While the Committee used to present more than one candidate in politically controversial 
cases, it changed the practice around 2012 and started to strictly recommend only one 
candidate to the Federal Assembly.107 Occasionally, this leads to contested elections 
when one party nevertheless puts up a candidate of its own.  
Before the Judiciary Committtee was established, sometimes candidates that were 
nominated by a party were not elected due to concerns on their qualifications, even if 
their party was underrepresented in the court at the time. When the Federal 
Administrative Court was established, the Federal Assembly had to appoint 72 new 
judges. The largest political party, the SVP, apparently failed to generate enough 
sufficiently qualified candidates. Therefore, the SVP was underrepresented compared to 
its electoral share by at least six judges.108 The SVP accepted this result for the time 
being. Along the same lines, the Federal Assembly elected on 21 December 2011 a 
female candidate as a judge of the Federal Administrative Court even though the 
Committee had noted in its report that she was a member of a party that was already 
slightly overrepresented. The Committee however found her to be the most suitable 
candidate.109 
However, while the Judiciary Committee and the Federal Assembly do put emphasis 
on the candidates’ qualifications, the membership in one of the major political parties 
remains almost a prerequisite to being elected as a federal judge: At the Federal Supreme 
Court, there has not been a politically independent judge since 1953, when Logoz J 
  
106 Bundesamt für Justiz (translation: Federal Office of Justice), above n 72, at ch II1. 
107 Sekretariat der Gerichtskommission Die Gerichtskommission der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung 
während der ersten Hälfte der 49 Legislaturperiode, 2011 - 2013 (2013) at 3 
<www.parlament.ch/d/organe-mitglieder/kommissionen/weitere-kommissionen/gerichtskommission/ 
Documents/gk-rueckblick-2011-2013-d.pdf> (translation: Secretary of the Judiciary Committee The 
Judiciary Committee during the first half of the 49th legislative term 2011-2013). 
108 See Gerichtskommission, above n 82, at 10. 
109 Gerichtskommission Bericht der Gerichtskommission vom 8 Dezember 2011 (11.210 b) at 2 <www. 
parlament.ch/sites/kb/2012/Kommissionsbericht_GK_12.200_2012-03-07.pdf> (translation: Judiciary 
Committee Report of the Judiciary Committee of 8 December 2011). 
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retired. 50 of the 72 judges at the Federal Administrative Court and all 38 full-time 
judges of the Supreme Court are members of a political party. Only seven Federal 
Administrative Court judges had declared to be neither a member nor a sympathiser of a 
party.110 The reports issued by the Judiciary Committee to the Federal Assembly suggest 
that the Committee usually first determines which linguistic region the judge should be 
from and which party is entitled to have one of its members appointed. Then, the 
Committee will focus on the applicants that meet these requirements and nominate the 
one that it perceives best suited. Aside from the candidates’ expertise the Committee will 
also take into account the gender, as women are still underrepresented at all federal 
courts. Therefore, while a candidate’s merit is an important—according to the Committee 
the most important111—criterion, it remains only one of several criteria. 
In New Zealand, in contrast, the appointment procedure is tailored to minimise 
political influences and to provide for appointments based entirely on merit.112 The 
procedure is mainly in the hands of the Attorney-General who must by convention act 
irrespective of political influences. Candidates are not discussed in Cabinet.113  
It is somewhat puzzling to an outsider such as this author that the power to decide 
whom to appoint, which by constitutional convention must be a decision free of any 
political considerations,114 is vested in a political actor who is appointed by the head of 
government, presumably following political considerations. The role of the Attorney-
General is, however, two-fold in that he or she is both a minister and the chief law officer 
of the Crown. Judicial appointments are made in the latter role.115 It appears that past 
Attorneys-General were fully aware of their responsibility and honoured their obligation 
to make appointments irrespective of party political considerations.116  
  
110 Gerichtskommission, above n 82, at 10. 
111 Hans Hess (25 September 2013) Amtliches Bulletin der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung  at 1784 
(translation: Official Protocol of the debates of the Federal Assembly) (stating that the fair representation of 
the political parties was the second most important criterion). 
112 See McGrath, above n 56, at 315. 
113 Joseph, above n 61, at 67. 
114 Ministry of Justice Appointing Judges: A Judicial Appointments Commission for New Zealand? 
(Ministry of Justice, Wellington, 2004) at 18. 
115 Joseph, above n 61, at 67. 
116 See McGrath, above n 56, at 316; Palmer, above n 102, at 44. 
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However, even in the New Zealand system, where political influences are minimised 
as far as possible, it is recognised that, while party politics may be eliminated, to some 
degree politics in a wider sense are always a part of the process.117 The former President 
of the Court of Appeal stated:118 
Appointments by the executive are inevitably political to a greater or less degree. 
Among candidates of roughly equal standing a Government must naturally be 
disposed to select one whose sympathies are thought to be congenial to its policies. 
Probably the more senior the judicial office, the more significant the political or 
philosophical factors. 
This is, in this author’s view, true not only of Governments but of any person who is 
given the power to appoint judges. If the term “policies” is framed wide enough such as 
to include for instance having “a broad view of and interest in society”119 or being “aware 
of and sensitive to the diversity of modern New Zealand society”120, then it becomes 
obvious that a candidate’s worldview is an element that is rightly considered in the course 
of the examination. Lawyers holding politically extremist views—for instance a racist or 
radical islamist—would hardly be deemed suitable for the bench. 
And this author ventures to suggest that considering a candidate’s worldview is 
nothing to be frowned upon. While it is true that the judiciary does not necessarily need 
to be representative,121 public confidence might be enhanced not only by diversity but 
also by a certain amount of what could be referred to as “macro-political 
representativity”. Diversity in cultural or gender-related terms is important in terms of 
“justice seen to be done”122 because it counteracts perceptions of the judiciary as a “self-
perpetuating oligarchy”123. The same holds true, albeit to a lesser extent, for macro-
political representativity. Such representativity has another benefit though, because it 
promotes a balanced composition of the courts. People’s political preferences are the 
expression of their view of how the society should be shaped and, accordingly, their 
  
117 See Palmer, above n 102, at 47. 
118 Robin Cooke “Empowerment and Accountability: The Quest for Administrative Justice” (1992) 18 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 1326 at 1331. 
119 Palmer, above n 102, at 47. 
120 McGrath, above n 56, at 315. 
121 Palmer, above n 102, at 41. 
122 See R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256 (CA) at 259. 
123 Palmer, above n 102, at 82. 
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attitude towards developments in society. And these views, it is submitted, inform to 
some extent their judicial decisions.  
The initial appointments to the New Zealand Supreme Court are perceived as 
evidence of the system working (meaning that the risk of being held accountable led the 
Attorney-General to do the right thing).124 Due to the Supreme Court being a newly 
established court, four Supreme Court judges needed to be appointed at the same time. 
The course of action most coherent with the New Zealand system was simply promoting 
the four most senior existing Court of Appeal judges. Indeed, according to Allan, this was 
what “many considered to be the only constitutionally proper [course of action]”.125 The 
Attorney-General however had first refused to promise that she would do that, claiming 
complete discretion instead. It was only after much backtracking due to political and 
grassroots opposition that she eventually confirmed to and then in fact did appoint the 
four most senior Court of Appeal judges.126 
These appointments were however unusual in just about every relevant aspect. This 
starts with the legal situation at the outset: At the time, there was arguably only one 
constitutionally correct way to handle the issue. Therefore, whether the appointments 
were made properly could be judged by the result. Somewhat ironically, critics of the 
Court would later doubt whether it was smart to “promote everybody en masse from the 
Court of Appeal”.127 
The second unusual point was the high profile character of the appointments due to 
their significance concerning the highest court of the land. It is difficult to imagine that a 
threatening opposition could be mobilised when only a District Court appointment was at 
stake. 
The third unusual point was the transparency created by the Attorney-General when 
she stated her intentions concerning the appointments. This alone made opposition 
possible in the first place.  
  
124 See Allan, above n 79, at 117. 
125 At 107. 
126 At 107. 
127 Phil Taylor “Justice in the firing line” New Zealand Herald (5 May 2012) 
<http://www.nzherald.co.nz/nz/news/article.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10803600>. 
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In contrast, with any other judicial appointment, the Attorney-General will not make 
anything public about why one candidate was preferred over another—the public will 
actually never know about any other candidate who was not preferred. Essentially, the 
public is left with naught but a name and the Attorney-General’s word it’s the best one. 
This leaves little room for accountability, as the accountability of a decision in cases 
where decision-making cannot be judged by its outcome (because the outcome cannot be 
determined to be right or wrong) is contingent on transparency. 
V. Discipline and removal from office of judges 
A. Term of office and re-election of Swiss judges 
New Zealand and Switzerland differ in a fundamental way: Unlike New Zealand judges, 
Swiss judges (with the exception of the judges in the Canton of Fribourg/Freiburg) do not 
have tenure. They are elected for a specific term of office instead. The term of office of 
all Federal court judges amounts to six years. Re-elections are permissible. Judges leave 
office at the end of the year in which they reach 68 years of age.128 
Re-election of federal court judges is usually a formality. For more than 100 years re-
election was only refused to judges based on the convention that they should leave office 
when they turn 70. However, in the last 25 years political attempts to put pressure on 
judges have become more frequent.129 This development came down to a judge of the 
Federal Supreme Court, Martin Schubarth, being refused re-election in 1990. This was 
then referred to as an “accident”—the intention had been “merely” to teach Schubarth J a 
lesson.130 Commentators noted that, while the Federal Supreme Court had rendered some 
politically controversial decisions in that year (inter alia forcing the last Canton to grant 
  
128 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005 (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme Court), art 
9(1)-(2). 
129 See Niccolo Raselli “Richterliche Unabhängigkeit” (2011) 3 Justice - Justiz - Giustizia at n 15 
<www.richterzeitung.ch> (translation: “Judicial independence”). 
130 At n 15. 
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women the right to vote131 and banning crucifixes from class rooms132), Schubarth J had 
not been involved in any of these decisions.133  
After much public criticism, the Federal Assembly re-elected Schubarth J a week 
later. The complaints against Schubarth J had been investigated by a parliamentary 
working group (the predecessor of the Judiciary Committee) and found not grave enough 
to justify denial of re-election. The working group acknowledged Schubarth J’s high level 
of expertise and noted that the quality of his work had not given reason to any 
complaints.134 
The Judiciary Committee recognized that the Federal Assembly should only refuse to 
re-elect a judge in cases where the requirements for the removal of the judge are met. 
Thus, in its Handlungsgrundsätze zum Verfahren der Kommission im Hinblick auf eine 
Amtsenthebung oder eine Nichtwiederwahl135 published in 2011, it stated that the 
procedural rules on removing a judge apply analogously in cases of refusal of re-
election.136 
The same or similar rules apply in most Cantons, even though the length of the term 
of office varies. The winner in this regard is the Canton of Ticino with 10 years.137 The 
lone exception, as noted above, is the Canton of Fribourg/Freiburg, where the pertinent 
act, the law on the judiciary, provides that judges are elected for an indefinite period of 
time.138 This was an innovation introduced by the new Constitution in 2004.139 Judges 
  
131 Rohner v Canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden [1990] 116 Ia BGE/ATF 359. 
132 Municipality of Cadro v Bernasconi [1990] 116 Ia BGE/ATF 252. 
133 Kurt Bruggisser “Zur Abwahl von Martin Schubarth” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich, 6 December 1990) 
at 21 (translation: “On the de-selection of Martin Schubarth”). 
134 Theo Fischer (12 December 1990) Amtliches Bulletin der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung at 2523 
(translation: Official Protocol of the debates of the Federal Assembly). 
135 Translation: Principles of action for the Committee’s procedure regarding removal or refusal of re-
election. 
136 Handlungsgrundsätze der Gerichtskommission zum Verfahren der Kommission im Hinblick auf eine 
Amtsenthebung oder eine Nichtwiederwahl 2011, art 15(1) (translation: Principles of action of the Judiciary 
Committee for the Committee’s procedure regarding removal or refusal of re-election). 
137 Costituzione della Repubblica e Cantone Ticino 1997, art 81(1) (translation: Constitution of the 
Republic and Canton of Ticino). 
138 Loi sur la justice du canton de Fribourg 2010/Justizgesetz des Kantons Freiburg 2010, art 6(1) 
(translation: Act on the judiciary of the Canton of Fribourg). 
35 Suter – Appointment, Discipline and Removal of Judges 
 
may only be removed from office in case of misconduct or incapability, if they cease to 
meet the requirements to be elected, or if they breach their duty to be a resident of the 
Canton of Fribourg/Freiburg.140  
In the past years, three judges of courts of the Cantons were either not re-elected or 
chose to resign when facing the real possibility of being denied the re-election. The most 
prominent case was the one of Ziegler J, then President of the Court of Appeal of the 
Canton of Schwyz. In 2010, after information on two criminal cases had been leaked to 
the media, Ziegler J secretly ordered a surveillance of the telephone and e-mails of the 
public prosecutors involved in the two cases. When this became public, the parliamentary 
committee in charge of the elections of judges decided in January 2012 to recommend to 
the parliament not to re-elect Ziegler J. After Ziegler J had filed suit against the Canton, 
the parties settled the case and Ziegler J resigned.141 
A judge in the Canton of Vaud was not re-elected in December 2012 by the 
parliament. To protect his privacy the parliament decided in a closed session. It was 
however publicly known that one of the reasons was that the judge had for years not paid 
his taxes.142 
The third judge, a Court of Appeal judge in the Canton of Aargau, was the target of a 
number of complaints. An investigation revealed that he had serious deficits in organising 
his work. In the parliamentary debate, the judge was also alleged to be heavily in debt. 
The presiding judges of the Court of Appeal barely supported him, and so did the 
parliamentary committee on the judiciary, recommending his re-election with seven 
against six votes. The parliament’s bureau, which comprises the presiding members of 
                                                                                                                                            
139 See Constitution du canton de Fribourg 2010/Verfassung des Kantons Freiburg 2010, art 121(2) 
(translation: Constitution of the Canton of Fribourg). 
140 Loi sur la justice du canton de Fribourg 2010/Justizgesetz des Kantons Freiburg 2010, art 107 
(translation: Act on the judiciary of the Canton of Fribourg). 
141 Katharina Fontana “Abfindung ist korrekt” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (26 October 2013) at 14 (translation: 
“Severance payment is correct”). 
142 Schweizerische Depeschen-Agentur “Waadtländer Richter abgewählt” St Galler Tagblatt Online (18 
December 2012) <www.tagblatt.ch/aktuell/panorama/panorama/Waadtlaender-Richter-abgewaehlt; 
art253654,3241026> (translation: “Judge in the Canton of Vaud deselected”). 
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the parliament and of its parties, however recommended not re-electing him. In the 
parliament only 48 out of 130 members voted to re-elect him.143 
Where judges are elected and re-elected by the people, deselections occur presumably 
more often, as the people will be less considerate of the principle of judicial 
independence and instead focus more on party membership. On the other hand, as a rule 
in terms of elections, those already holding office have an advantage over their 
challengers since they are usually better known to the public. With regard to the effect on 
judicial independence, it could be argued that this kind of re-election does not prejudice 
judicial independence because a judge’s deselection is usually not a consequence of his or 
her decisions. Instead, it is often quite simply a matter of their political party’s electoral 
share decreasing in general. 
B. Obligations of Swiss judges vis-à vis their parties 
Another issue undermining judicial independence is that it is customary in Switzerland 
that political parties receive a share in what their members earn as public officials. This is 
referred to as “Mandatssteuern” (“contributions des élus”, “contributi di mandato”), 
which could be translated as “taxation of mandate”. Judges are deemed to be such public 
officials by the parties and are accordingly expected to pass on a part of their judicial 
salary. The exact amount varies: While some parties receive a fix amount, most will 
demand a percentage of the income, which may range between two and ten per cent.  
These Mandatssteuern provide a substantial part of most parties’ revenues. 
Accordingly, it is likely that the parties rely to some extent on receiving Mandatssteuern 
as part of their revenues. Generally, the parties on the left tend to be more dependent on 
income from their members since they will receive less sizable donations from big 
business. Presumably, the parties would therefore not tolerate if a judge refused to pay 
them. The judge’s re-election would certainly be in danger. According to a newspaper 
article of 2012, most major parties experienced that judges would resign from the party 
  
143 Urs Moser “Abwahl von Oberrichter Schuppisser: Grünliberale beklagen Schlammschlacht” Aargauer 
Zeitung (20 August 2013) <http://www.aargauerzeitung.ch/aargau/kanton-aargau/artikel-127090472> 
(translation: “Deselection of Court of Appeal Judge Schuppisser: Green-liberal party complains about 
mudslinging)”. 
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and accordingly stop payment immediately after having been re-elected for the last time 
possible.144  
At the election day in 1990 when Schubarth J was refused re-election, another judge, 
Leu J, was only barely re-elected, receiving two more than the required 116 votes. One 
member of parliament alleged a week later that Leu J had received so few votes mainly 
because he had not paid his Mandatssteuern.145 According to a commentator however, 
Leu J had been criticised for acting as an arbitrator in arbitration cases in a sideline job at 
a time when the Federal Supreme Court was complaining about excessive workload.146 
Whichever allegation concerning Leu J was true, there can be no doubt that the judges 
must feel some pressure to pay their Mandatssteuern if they do not want to endanger their 
re-election. However, a refusal of payment would presumably not be enough for the other 
parties to deselect a judge. 
C. A de facto tenure? 
Against this background, it could be argued that Swiss federal court judges enjoy a de 
facto tenure. This appears to be confirmed by the recent past: 
Early in this millennium, the Federal Supreme Court had rendered three decisions that 
instigated public debates: The first two both concerned the question whether applications 
for the citizenship could be ruled on by holding a public vote. The Court held this to be 
unconstitutional.147 Both decisions were published in 2003.  
A year later, the Court rendered an even more contested decision on the criminal 
liability of racist speeches. Since according to the Swiss Criminal Code racial 
  
144 Pascal Unternährer “Warum ausgerechnet die Unparteiischen in einer Partei sein müssen” Tages-
Anzeiger online (4 June 2012) <www.tagesanzeiger.ch/zuerich/region/Warum-ausgerechnet-die-
Unparteiischen-in-einer-Partei-sein-muessen/story/23157169> (translation: “On why the impartial of all 
people need to be members of a party)”. 
145 Christoph Blocher (12 December 1990) Amtliches Bulletin der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung 
(translation: Official Protocol of the debates of the Federal Assembly) at 2521. 
146 Raul Lautenschütz “Mässiges Wahlergebnis für Bundespräsident Cotti: Bundesrichter Schubarth nicht 
bestätigt” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich, 6 December 1990) at 21 (translation: “Mediocre election result 
for Federal president Cotti: Federal Supreme Court judge Schubarth not re-elected”). 
147 A v Municipality of Emmen [2003] 129 I BGE/ATF 217; Schweizerische Volkspartei der Stadt Zürich 
(SVP) v Municipality of Zurich [2003] 129 I BGE/ATF 232. 
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discrimination was only criminally liable when committed publicly,148 the question 
presented to the Court was whether a meeting of skinheads in a forest cabin was “public” 
in the sense of the law. The Court did not apply definitions of “public” found in previous 
decisions and instead held that whatever was said outside of a strictly private setting was 
considered as “public”.149 
All three decisions went against the policy of the SVP, which accordingly criticised 
the Court for the first two decisions, stating that they challenged the foundation of the 
direct democracy.150 While these decisions were thus criticised in a comparably civilised 
manner, a harsh reaction followed the last one. In a press release the SVP argued that, at 
the time the provision was enacted, the authorities had promised that the provision would 
only be applied where the public was highly affected. It thought that the Court was 
engaging in politics. At the end of the press release the SVP threatened with 
„einschneidenden Konsequenzen bei der nächsten Wahl des Bundesgerichts” (“serious 
consequences at the next re-election of the Federal Supreme Court”).151 
The term of office turned out to be too long though. When the Federal Supreme Court 
judges were put up for re-election four years later, the wounds had apparently healed, and 
the judges who had participated in the decision were re-elected comfortably with results 
from 185 to 216 out of 224 votes.152 
In 2010, the presiding judge of the Court’s second division on social insurance law, 
Meyer J, had been prominently involved in a highly contested decision.153 In this case the 
Court, partly overruling its previous case law, made it nigh impossible for insured 
persons suffering from chronic whiplash injury to be granted a disability pension. The 
  
148 See Schweizerisches Strafgesetzbuch (translation: Swiss Crimina Code) 1937, art 261bis. 
149 Public Prosecutor of the Canton of Bern v X [2004] 130 IV BGE/ATF 111 at 119. 
150 SVP “SVP gegen Aushöhlung der Volksrechte” Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 
<www.svp.ch/index.cfm/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/svp-gegen-aushoehlung-der-volksrechte/> 
(translation: “SVP against erosion of democratic rights”). 
151 SVP “Privatsphäre abgeschafft?” Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 
<www.svp.ch/index.cfm/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/privatsphaere-abgeschafft/> (translation: “Abolition 
of privacy?”). 
152 See (1 October 2008) Amtliches Bulletin der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung at 1589 (translation: 
Official Protocol of the debates of the Federal Assembly). 
153 IV-Stelle Lucerne v S [2010] 136 V BGE/ATF 279. 
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decision had drawn much public criticism, part of which was aimed directly at Meyer J 
who had in 2010 published an essay, in which he had criticised the previous case law.154 
At the re-election of 2014 however, no acts of retaliation against Meyer J occurred. 
As stated above, the Federal Supreme Court from time to time faced the question 
whether Federal or international law prevails in case of conflict.155 Traditionally, the 
Court’s case law held that international law should in principle prevail, except if the 
legislator intentionally enacted a Federal law that is in conflict with international law 
(Schubert case).156 In a number of recent cases though the Federal Supreme Court held 
that international law must prevail in cases where the international law is aimed at the 
protection of human rights (such as the European Convention on Human Rights).157  
Of particular interest in this regard is the 2013 case X v Canton of Thurgau, which 
was decided by the second division on public law of the Federal Supreme Court, by a 
panel of five judges consisting of Zünd, Seiler, Aubry Girardin, Donzallaz and 
Stadelmann JJ158. The appellant X was a Macedonian citizen who had immigrated to 
Switzerland in 1994 at the age of seven. In 2010 he had been convicted for dealing with 
heroin and sentenced to 18 months imprisonment. The immigration authorities therefore 
cancelled his residence permit in 2011. The Court upheld X’s appeal against the decision 
of the immigration authorities. It found, considering all circumstances, that the decision 
interfered disproportionately with his right to respect his family life and was therefore in 
violation of art 8 of the ECHR.159 
The Court then turned to art 121 of the Swiss Constitution, the relevant paragraphs 3 
and 4 of which read as follows:160 
  
154 See Thomas Gächter and Dania Tremp “Praxisänderung zur Invalidenrente nach einem HWS-Trauma” 
(27 September 2010) Jusletter <www.jusletter.ch> at [1]–[3] and [57] (translation: “Change in the case law 
regarding disability pensions following a whiplash injury”). 
155 See above at III.C.1.c). 
156 See Schubert v Canton of Ticino, above n 23. 
157 See A v Federal Council, above n 24; Eidgenössische Zollverwaltung v X, above n 24. 
158 X v Canton of Thurgau [2013] 139 I BGE/ATF 16. 
159 At 22–23. 
160 Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft 1999, art 190 (translation: Federal 
Constitution of the Swiss Confederation) as per the semi-official translation on 
<http://www.admin.ch/opc/en/classified-compilation/19995395/index.html>. 
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3 Irrespective of their status under the law on foreign nationals, foreign nationals 
shall lose their right of residence and all other legal rights to remain in Switzerland if 
they: 
a. are convicted with legal binding effect of an offence of intentional homicide, 
rape or any other serious sexual offence, any other violent offence such as robbery, 
the offences of trafficking in human beings or in drugs, or a burglary offence; or 
b. have improperly claimed social insurance or social assistance benefits.  
4 The legislature shall define the offences covered by paragraph 3 in more detail. It 
may add additional offences.  
Paragraphs 3 to 6 of art 121 of the Swiss Constitution had been inserted only very 
recently by way of a popular initiative, which had been approved in a public vote on 28 
Nov 2010 by the majority of the people and the Cantons. The Court ruled that these 
provisions were not self-executing because they were too vague to be applied directly.161 
It then went on to hold in an obiter dictum that—even if the provisions were applicable—
the outcome of the case would remain the same because it would still be bound by art 8 
of the ECHR when applying art 121 of the Swiss Constitution.162  
The commentator for the newspaper Neue Zürcher Zeitung163 (NZZ) noted that in the 
public hearing one member of the Court had argued that art 121 of the Swiss Constitution 
should be applied and the appeal therefore dismissed. The majority, consisting of the 
other four members of the panel, however disagreed with him.164 While the NZZ did not 
mention the names of the five judges, and in particular the name of the dissenting judge, 
his identity is revealed by the later course of events to be Seiler J. Notably, Seiler J was 
one of two judges in the panel who are members of the SVP, which had proposed the new 
art 121 of the Swiss Constitution. The reason we can assume it to be Seiler J is as 
follows: 
  
161 X v Canton of Thurgau, above n 158, at 24–28. 
162 At 28–31. 
163 Translation: New  
164 Markus Felber “Verfassungsrechtlicher Diskurs mit Tiefgang” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich, 13 
October 2012) at 15 (translation: “Constitutional law discourse with depth”). 
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When the written decision was published in early 2013, Seiler J’s party, the SVP, 
criticised the decision in a press release as “subversive”.165 However, they did not rest on 
that. In 2014, all Federal Supreme Court judges’ term of office ended and the judges were 
accordingly to be re-elected by the Federal Assembly on 24 September 2014. The SVP 
chose not to re-elect the four judges that had decided to uphold the appeal because they 
wanted foreign law to prevail over domestic law, as one Councillor put it.166 While they 
did not officially announce this in Parliament, it became apparent in the election results of 
the judges. 224 of the 246 members of the Federal Assembly were present. Being the 
strongest party, the SVP currently holds 59 out of the 246 seats in the Federal Assembly. 
The SVP’s position resulted in the four Judges Zünd, Aubry Girardin, Donzallaz and 
Stadelmann JJ receiving between 159 and 167 votes, the lowest numbers of votes of all 
35 judges to be re-elected.167 All other judges received between 204 and 222 votes, with 
the exception of Seiler J at 198,168 who did not enjoy the full support of the left-wing 
parties.169 
There is no official information available on which councillors did or did not vote for 
particular judges. However, the election results suggest that the councillors who are 
members of the SVP abided rather strictly by their party’s request, even though one of 
these four judges, Donzallaz J, is himself a member of the SVP.  
What conclusions can be drawn from the recent events? The decisions presented 
above suggest that the Federal Supreme Court is not intimidated by upcoming re-
elections. A commentator noted in this regard shortly before the re-elections that these 
did not appear to seriously bother anyone at the Court.170 In particular the most recent 
  
165 SVP “Bundesgericht will Volk und Parlament entmachten” Schweizerische Volkspartei SVP 
<www.svp.ch/index.cfm/aktuell/medienmitteilungen/bundesgericht-will-volk-und-parlament-entmachten/> 
(translation: “Federal Supreme Court wants to disempower the people and the parliament)”. 
166 Jan Flückiger “Parlament wählt zwei neue Bundesrichter” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich, 25 September 
2014) at 12 (translation: “Parliament elects two new Federal Supreme Court judges)”. 
167 See (24 September 2014) Amtliches Bulletin der Vereinigten Bundesversammlung at 1879 (translation: 
Official Protocol of the debates of the Federal Assembly). 
168 At 1879. 
169 Flückiger, above n 166, at 12. 
170 Katharina Fontana “Die Frauen kommen” Neue Zürcher Zeitung (Zurich, 11 September 2014) at 10 
(translation: “The women are coming”). 
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decision in the case X v Canton of Thurgau seems to be testament to the Court being 
unaffected. In said case the Court was bold enough to express its opinion in an obiter 
dictum while the political debate on the implementation of art 121 of the Swiss 
Constitution was ongoing.  
At the same time, the latest re-election results reveal that the largest political party in 
Switzerland, the SVP, which since 2003 has been receiving consistently more than 25% 
of the votes, does not care greatly about judicial independence. The question arises 
naturally what would happen if the SVP were to reach a majority. This however seems 
highly unlikely given that since 1919 no single party ever even reached an electoral share 
of 29%.171 
D. Discipline and removal from office of Swiss judges 
1. Discipline and removal from office of Federal judges 
The Federal Assembly may remove judges from office before they completed their term 
in case of either misconduct or incabability. Misconduct is given, according to the 
pertinent provisions in all Federal acts, if a judge “wilfully or through gross negligence 
commits serious breaches of his or her official duties”.172 Incapability is given if a judge 
“has permanently lost the ability to perform his or her official duties”.173  
The test of misconduct consists of two elements, both a subjective and an objective 
one. The objective element is the serious breach of an official duty, which may be any 
behaviour that seriously and objectively damages the reputation and independence of the 
  
171 See above at II.B. 
172 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2005, art 10(a) (translation: Federal Act on the 
Federal Administrative Court); Bundesgesetz über das Bundespatentgericht 2009 (translation: Federal Act 
on the Federal Patent Court), art 14(a); Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Strafbehörden des Bundes 
2010, art 49(a) (translation: Federal Act on the Organisation of the Federal Criminal Justice Authorities). 
173 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesverwaltungsgericht 2005, art 10(b) (translation: Federal Act on the 
Federal Administrative Court); Bundesgesetz über das Bundespatentgericht 2009, art 14(b) (translation: 
Federal Act on the Federal Patent Court); Bundesgesetz über die Organisation der Strafbehörden des 
Bundes 2010, art 49(b) (translation: Federal Act on the Organisation of the Federal Criminal Justice 
Authorities). 
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office.174 The subjective element requires that the judge committed the act either with 
intent or through gross negligence, thereby excluding slight negligence. 
The Judiciary Committee will initiate proceedings if it finds, after the judge has been 
heard, that there is a reasonable suspicion that either of the two conditions for removal is 
satisfied. If the investigation reveals either misconduct or incabability as defined by the 
law, the Committee submits a written report to the Federal Assembly including a motion 
to remove the judge from office.175  
The Federal Assembly has a certain amount of discretion, which is expressed in the 
wording that it “may” remove judges if the requirements are met. In a memorandum, the 
Ministry of Justice held that this discretion should be exercised in order to uphold the 
principle of proportionality.176 The decision of the Federal Assembly may not be brought 
before a court pursuant to the constitution, which states in art 189(4) that Acts of the 
Federal Assembly may not be challenged in the Federal Supreme Court. 
These rules apply to all federal judges except for the Federal Supreme Court judges 
who are immune from discipline, as will be shown below. 
In a 2003 report, the Ministry of Justice held the lack of judicial review to be in line 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). It found the right to a fair trial 
disputes concerning “civil rights and obligations” as guaranteed in art 6(1) ECHR did not 
apply to the removal of judges.177 When reaching this conclusion, it relied on a decision 
of the European Court on Human Rights in Pitkevich v Russia, which held, applying its 
Pellegrin v France judgment178, that a “judge participates directly in the exercise of 
  
174 Bundesamt für Justiz Amtspflichten der Richterinnen und Richter der erstinstanzlichen Bundesgerichte 
(VPB 2008.24) at 313 (translation: Federal Office of Justice Official duties of federal judges). 
175 Handlungsgrundsätze der Gerichtskommission zum Verfahren der Kommission im Hinblick auf eine 
Amtsenthebung oder eine Nichtwiederwahl 2011, art 5-14 (translation: Principles of action of the Judiciary 
Committee for the Committee’s procedure regarding removal or refusal of re-election). 
176 Bundesamt für Justiz (translation: Federal Office of Justice), above n 174, at 314. 
177 Bundesamt für Justiz Richterliche Unabhängigkeit Disziplinarische Verantwortlichkeit von 
Bundesrichtern Amtsenthebung Neue gesetzliche Massnahmen Schlichtungsverfahren Selbstregulierung 
und Konfliktlösungsmöglichkeiten des Bundesgerichts (VPB 68.49 2003) at n 46 (translation: Federal 
Office of Justice Judicial Independence Discipline of Federal Supreme Court Judges Removal from Office 
New legal measures Self-regulation and conflict resolution of the Federal Supreme Court). 
178 Pellegrin v France (1999) 31 EHRR 651 (Grand Chamber, ECHR). 
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powers conferred by public law and performs duties designed to safeguard the general 
interests of the State“.179 Consequently, a judge’s dismissal was found not to concern her 
civil rights or obligations within the meaning of art 6(1) of the ECHR.180 However, 
Pellegrin is not anymore good law in determining whether employment disputes 
concerning public servants fall within the scope of art 6(1) of the ECHR: In the case of 
Eskelinen v Finland, the Court found that the criterion adopted in Pellegrin needed to be 
further developed.181 It held:182 
In order for the exclusion to be justified, it is not enough for the State to establish 
that the civil servant in question participates in the exercise of public power or that 
there exists, to use the words of the Court in Pellegrin, a “special bond of trust and 
loyalty” between the civil servant and the State, as employer. It is also for the State 
to show that the subject matter of the dispute in issue is related to the exercise of 
State power or that it has called into question the special bond. Thus, there can in 
principle be no justification for the exclusion from the guarantees of Article 6 of 
ordinary labour disputes, such as those relating to salaries, allowances or similar 
entitlements, on the basis of the special nature of relationship between the particular 
civil servant and the State in question. 
The Court has ever since reiterated that two conditions must be fulfilled in order for 
art 6(1) of the ECHR not to apply:183  
Firstly, the State in its national law must have expressly excluded access to a court 
for the post or category of staff in question. Secondly, the exclusion must be justified 
on objective grounds in the State’s interest.  
Swiss legal scholars concluded in 2008 that the consequences of Eskelinen v Finland 
on the status of judges were unclear.184 In the case of Suküt v Turkey, which concerned an 
applicant that had been discharged from the army for breaches of discipline, the Court 
found that the “special bond of trust and loyalty” was at the heart of the dispute.185 It 
  
179 Pitkevich v Russia Section II, ECHR 47936/99, 8 February 2001 at 8. 
180 At 8. 
181 Eskelinen v Finland (2007) 45 EHRR 43 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [56]. 
182 At [62]. 
183 Cudak v Lithuania (2010) 51 EHRR 15 (Grand Chamber, ECHR) at [42]. 
184 Regina Kiener and others Verfahren der Erneuerungswahl von Richterinnen und Richtern des Bundes 
(VPB 2008.26) at 364 (translation: Procedure of re-election of federal judges). 
185 Suküt v Turkey Section II, ECHR 59773/00, 11 September 2007 at 8. 
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seems that the same could be said of proceedings to remove a judge from office for 
breaches of official duties.  
Therefore, in this author’s opinion, the exclusion of a judicial review in art 189(4) of 
the Bundesverfassung is not in violation of art 6(1) of the ECHR. It might, however, 
constitute a violation of art 13 of the ECHR. This article provides that: 
Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in this Convention are violated 
shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the 
violation has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity. 
In one of its leading cases on art 13 of the ECHR, de Souza Ribeiro v France, the 
Court held:186 
The Court has reiterated on numerous occasions that Article 13 of the Convention 
guarantees the availability at national level of a remedy to enforce the substance of 
the Convention rights and freedoms in whatever form they are secured in the 
domestic legal order. The effect of this Article is thus to require the provision of a 
domestic remedy allowing the competent national authority both to deal with an 
“arguable complaint” under the Convention and to grant appropriate relief. 
In order to be able to invoke the guarantee provided in art 13 of the ECHR a person 
must present an “arguable claim” of a violation of the ECHR. Should a judge who has 
been removed from office be able to make it plausible that his or her right to respect for 
private and family life or the freedoms of thought, conscience and religion, of expression 
or of assembly and association were violated, then a domestic remedy must be 
available.187 While the “authority” referred to in art 13 of the ECHR does not necessarily 
have to be a judicial authority, it must nevertheless be independent and the remedy must 
be effective.188 Given that Swiss legislation provides no domestic remedy whatsoever 
there can be no doubt that Switzerland would be in violation of art 13 of the ECHR 
should such a case occur. 
While Federal judges may be removed from office in case of serious misconduct, they 
are not subject to discipline for minor misconduct.  
  
186 de Souza Ribeiro v France Grand Chamber, ECHR 22689/07, 13 December 2012 at [78]. 
187 Kiener and others, above n 184, at 366. 
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2. No discipline or removal from office of Federal Supreme Court judges 
Federal Supreme Court judges are immune from any kind of discipline and can 
accordingly not be removed from office.189 In this regard, their position is similar to the 
one of Federal Councillors.190 They are expected to resign on their own initiative should 
they be guilty of a misconduct that is incompatible with their position.191 The lack of 
remedy in case of a Federal Supreme Court judge’s misconduct or incapability was drawn 
to the public’s attention when Federal Supreme Court judge Martin Schubarth was 
accused and found guilty of misconduct in 2003. 
Schubarth J, being dissatisfied with the coverage of the court’s case law by the Swiss 
newspaper “Neue Zürcher Zeitung”, apparently tried to spit on a journalist working for 
said newspaper within the confines of the court’s building. He missed his target and 
instead hit a law clerk whom the journalist was talking to. At the same time accusations 
were made that Schubarth J had misused his powers as the presiding judge of the criminal 
division of the court.192 
The Federal Supreme Court confirmed the spitting incident in a press release and 
decided not to allocate Schubarth J any more cases. The Court called on Schubarth J to 
resign immediately. Schubarth J declined to do so.193  
The incident and the accusations were then investigated by a parliamentary 
commission, which found that Schubarth J had in one case declared a judgment as 
unanimous even though one of the three judges had announced his dissent.194 It was held 
that the spitting incident constituted a gross breach of manners that did not go along with 
  
189 Bundesamt für Justiz (translation: Federal Office of Justice), above n 177, at ch II131. 
190 See above at II.A. 
191 Geschäftsprüfungskommissionen des Nationalrates und des Ständerates Untersuchung von besonderen 
Vorkommnissen am Bundesgericht (BBl 2004 5647) at 5683 (translation: Audit Commission of the Federal 
Parliament Investigation of special occurrences at the Federal Supreme Court). 
192 Geschäftsprüfungskommissionen des Nationalrates und des Ständerates  Jahresbericht 2002/2003 der 
Geschäftsprüfungskommissionen und der Geschäftsprüfungsdelegation der eidgenössischen Räte (BBl 
2004 1637) at 1706 (translation: Audit Commission of the Federal Parliament Annual Report of the Audit 
Commission and the Audit Delegation of the Federal Parliament 2002/2003). 
193 At 1706. 
194 At 1707. 
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the position of a Federal Supreme Court judge.195 The commission noted that Federal 
Supreme Court judges are not subject to disciplinary authority.196 It called on Schubarth J 
to resign, which he eventually did. 
The case of Schubarth J remains the sole incident of that kind involving a federal 
judge. No other federal judge was forced to resign or removed from office yet. 
3. Discipline and removal from office in the Cantons 
Most Cantons have adopted the rule that a judge may be removed from office in case of 
misconduct and incapability. The Canton of Bern has added the case of permanent 
insufficient performance as a further ground for removal.  
The power to remove a judge lies with different authorities. In most Cantons, the 
power is granted either to the parliament, the court of appeal or the presiding judges of 
the court of appeal.  
In case of a removal of a judge from a court of first instance, the competent authority 
is usually the court of appeal or its presiding judges. If the judge to be removed from 
office is a court of appeal judge, then usually either the administrative court, if any, or the 
parliament will make the decision. The Canton of Bern has opted for the first system, in 
which the Court of Appeal has the power to discipline Administrative Court judges and 
the Administrative Court has the power to discipline Court of Appeal judges. 
An example for the latter system, where the decision is made by the parliament, is 
found in the Cantons of Basel-Stadt and Basel-Landschaft. In these cases the law of the 
Canton must allow an appeal from the parliament’s decision to a court as a matter of 
Federal law.197 While the Federal law allows an exception for decisions having a 
predominantly political character, a judge’s removal from office does not fall in that 
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196 At 1707. 
197 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 86(2) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court). 
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category.198 Not all Cantons appear to be aware of that rule, as the laws of some Cantons 
provide for a “final decision” of the parliament.199 
The Canton of Aargau, in its reform of the judiciary in 2011, appears to have installed 
what could be called the most modern system of removal of judges. At the core of this 
system is the establishment of a specialised court to deal with such matters: The 
Justizgericht (“judiciary court”). While minor disciplinary matters are dealt with by a 
special committee consisting of three judges of the Court of Appeal, the Justizgericht is 
the sole court in the Canton to decide on the removal of judges.200 It consists of three 
judges that are elected by the parliament. They are the only judges at courts in the Canton 
of Aargau who are not required to be residents of Aargau and for whom no age limit has 
been set.201 The latter rule reflects the legislator’s idea that the Justizgericht should be 
composed of experienced lawyers. 
E. Discipline and removal from office of New Zealand judges 
In New Zealand, the powers and procedures to discipline judges are codified in the 
Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004 (JCCJCPA).202 
This Act established the Office of the Judicial Conduct Commissioner as the authority to 
conduct preliminary investigations of complaints against judges. The commissioner is 
appointed by the Governor-General on the recommendation of the House of 
Representatives and after consultation of the Chief Justice.203 Having investigated the 
complaint, the commissioner has four options of how to go on:  
  
198 Bundesgesetz über das Bundesgericht 2005, art 86(3) (translation: Federal Act on the Federal Supreme 
Court). 
199 See Loi sur la justice du canton de Fribourg 2010/Justizgesetz des Kantons Freiburg 2010, art 109 
(translation: Act on the judiciary of the Canton of Fribourg). 
200 Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz des Kantons Aargau 2011, § 38(1)(a) (translation: Act on the organisation 
of the judiciary of the Canton of Aargau). 
201 Gerichtsorganisationsgesetz des Kantons Aargau 2011, § 16(1) and § 18(3) (translation: Act on the 
organisation of the judiciary of the Canton of Aargau). 
202 Joseph, above n 61, at 73. 
203 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act 2004, s 7. 
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a) take no further action, if further consideration of the complaint would be 
unjustified;204 
b) dismiss the complaint, if it fails to meet the required threshold;205 
c) refer the complaint to the Head of Bench, unless one of the other three options 
are selected;206 
d) recommend the appointment of a Judicial Conduct Panel, if an inquiry is 
justified and the alleged conduct is misconduct that may warrant consideration 
of removal from office.207 
If a complaint has substance, the “default option” is referral to the Head of Bench.208 
Given that the Head of Bench has no disciplinary powers over other judges,209 his or her 
findings are not binding on the judge.  
The most important distinction is made between complaints alleging minor 
misconduct and complaint alleging serious misbehaviour, that is misbehaviour that may 
warrant consideration of removal from office.210 In the latter case, the commissioner 
recommends that the Attorney-General appoint a Judicial Conduct Panel to investigate 
into the alleged misconduct and report on it to the Attorney-General.211 The members of 
the panel, of which one must be a layperson and the other two must be judges or retired 
judges or one (retired) judge and one legal practitioner, are appointed ad hoc by the 
Attorney-General212 after consultation with the Chief Justice.213 While the panel’s report 
must include its opinion as to whether consideration of removal of the Judge is 
justified,214 the Attorney-General enjoys absolute discretion in deciding on whether to 
  
204 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act, s 15A. 
205 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act, s 16. 
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212 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act, s 22(1). 
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press for removal.215 However, a judge must not be removed from office if the panel did 
not consider removal justified.216  
If the Attorney-General agrees with the panel, he or she will take steps to initiate the 
removal of that Judge from office. While the procedure to be followed depends on 
whether the judge is a superior court judge or an inferior court judge, the actual removal 
lies in both cases in the hands of the Governor-General.217 
Where an inferior court judges is concerned, the Governor-General must, by 
constitutional convention, act on the advice of the Attorney-General.218 The decision is 
therefore the Attorney-General’s whether to seek the judge’s removal. In contrast, 
superior court judges can only be removed upon address of the House of 
Representatives.219 The same holds true, in an anomaly, for Employment Court judges.220 
In these cases, the Attorney-General accordingly has to address Parliament, which then 
decides having exclusive cognisance whether to seek the judge’s removal.221 
As to the threshold that needs to be met for removal the High Court cited approvingly 
from a Privy Council decision222:223  
So important is judicial independence that removal of a judge can only be justified 
where the shortcomings of the judge are so serious as to destroy confidence in the 
judge’s ability properly to perform the judicial function.  
The High Court rejected the assertion that misbehaviour necessarily involves moral 
turpitude.224  
Both the commissioner’s recommendation225 and the Attorney-General’s decision to 
appoint a panel are susceptible to judicial review in the High Court.226 The same holds 
  
215 Judicial Conduct Commissioner and Judicial Conduct Panel Act, s 33(1). 
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true for the decision of the Governor-General to remove the judge,227 whereas the 
decision of the House of Representatives as a proceeding in Parliament is immune from 
judicial scrutiny.228 This immunity is thought to extend to the Attorney-General’s 
decision whether to move an address.229 
Regardless of the threshold that needs to be met, New Zealand judges enjoy a 
remarkable “procedural” security from unjustified attacks: Removal from office requires 
that both the commissioner and the Attorney-General agree that the alleged conduct 
justifies investigation by a panel and that the panel, the Attorney-General, a majority of 
the House of Representatives230 and the Governor-General find the conduct to justify 
removal.  
The establishment of the commissioner and the panel makes perfectly sense in terms 
of having independent investigators. In contrast, the Attorney-General’s absolute 
discretion in determining whether or not removal is justified seems questionable. What if 
an Attorney-General, despite a panel’s conclusion, declined to initiate the removal of a 
judge whom that very Attorney-General had appointed? Nevertheless, there is some logic 
to the involvement of the Attorney-General and the Governor-General, as “the 
prerogative to appoint judges imports also the prerogative to remove judges”.231  
The odd one out of the involved authorities is the House of Representatives. There are 
undoubtedly good reasons not to involve the Parliament when appointing judges and the 
very same reasons are no less valid when it comes to removing judges. The decision 
whether to dismiss a judge should, if anything, be less informed by political 
considerations than the decision whether to appoint a judge. 
The involvement of the House, the most political institution in the country, is perhaps 
best explained as deeply rooted in history: It dates back to the beginning of the eighteenth 
century, when it was established in the United Kingdom that senior judges could only be 
                                                                                                                                            
226 At [144]. 
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dismissed by a motion of both houses of Parliament.232 Accordingly, before the 
JCCJCPA was enacted in 2004 the removal from office of judges was a matter of the 
exclusive cognisance of Parliament. An address seeking to remove a judge from office 
could be moved by any Member of Parliament.233 
The parliamentary debates reveal that some Members of Parliament were hard pressed 
to accept losing their right to move an address for a judge’s removal from office, as 
evidenced by a statement of Richard Worth MP:234  
I also resent the fact that a right I have as a member of Parliament to move an 
address seeking the removal of a judge is to be taken away from me and other 
members of the House. 
Against this background, the reform implemented through the enactment of the 
JCCJCPA appears to be a prudent way of reducing Parliament’s discretion by tying it to 
both an investigation by a panel and an address by the Attorney-General without taking 
the ultimate decision away from Parliament.  
For the aforementioned reasons it seems inappropriate too that in Switzerland the 
Federal Assembly is competent to decide on removing federal judges, even though this is 
consistent with the axiom that “the prerogative to appoint judges imports also the 
prerogative to remove judges”.235 While there is some force to this axiom in principle, it 
does not extend to jurisdictions such as Switzerland where judicial appointments are 
made by political bodies following political considerations. The decision on whether 
removal from office is justified is strictly a matter of the law’s interpretation and 
application. The requirements that need to be met are clearly stated in legislation and 
there are no political implications to be considered. Such decisions should not be made by 
parliaments but by bodies that are trained and appointed to do just that: courts of law. 
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VI. Conclusions 
New Zealand inherited the English tradition that the judicial bench is reserved for 
experienced lawyers who are appointed based on merit alone. This provides for a 
judiciary where the standard of quality is consistently high even in the inferior courts.  
Switzerland on the other hand traditionally embraced the view that anybody whom the 
people (or the parliament as their representatives) deem worthy may be a judge. This has 
endowed Switzerland’s lower courts with a wide range of judges from laypersons to 
respected lawyers. Over time, the standards for judges were raised because the parties 
became more and more aware of the importance judges having experience in the legal 
profession, yet lay judges are still found at many lower courts and even some higher 
courts of the Cantons. 
The criteria for selecting the judges are naturally not identical in the two countries. 
New Zealand judges are appointed based on merit. Even though the appointments are 
effectively made by a politician, they are not made in a political role, and party politics 
apparently play no part at all. In contrast, Switzerland selects its judges openly following 
political considerations, which this author submits is not as bad as it sounds. Switzerland 
has always aimed at all major political tendencies taking part in the exercise of the power 
of the state. Accordingly, as a matter of tradition, the courts are usually composed of a 
number of judges who, ideally, display the range of political tendencies in the society. 
This paper argues that having a diversity of political views at the courts is beneficial in 
terms of “justice seen to be done”, as it may counteract perceptions of the judiciary as a 
self-perpetuating oligarchy.  
That being said, there is no persuasive argument—or argument at all, for that 
matter—in favour of restricting the pool of candidates to members of the political parties 
since party membership is not common in Switzerland: Only about 3% of the citizens are 
members of a political party. While an argument could be made that some judges are not 
party members but merely declare to sympathise with a party, this still leaves out all 
politically neutral candidates—arguably those who are best suited to be a judge.  
Unlike New Zealand judges, Swiss judges (with the exception of the Canton of 
Fribourg/Freiburg) are not granted the security of tenure but are elected for a comparably 
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short term of office. This is of course undermining judicial independence as it creates 
opportunities for politicians to retaliate against inconvenient judges.  
Nevertheless, in the past Swiss judges arguably enjoyed a de facto tenure: While 
legislation has always left room for pressure on judges with the need of re-election, the 
parliaments have been aware of their responsibility to safeguard the judges’ 
independence. In the last few decades though, the tonality in federal politics has become 
harsher, and this extends to the tonality chosen by politicians versus judges. An 
increasing number of politicians can no longer be trusted to give preference to judicial 
independence over their political agenda. At the same time, the available evidence in the 
form of both case law and journalists’ observations suggests that Swiss judges are 
anything but intimidated. 
Against this background, a reform of the Swiss system of election and re-election of 
judges would certainly be preferable. It is, however, not likely to happen, as the political 
parties are the ones that benefit most from the current system—both by being able to 
select the judges and by receiving a share of their judges’ incomes.  
A comparison of the procedures to be followed in order to remove a judge from office 
reveals a high level of protection for New Zealand judges. The recent reform in 2004 
restricted the once unlimited power of Parliament by subjecting it to a prior investigation 
and an address by the Attorney-General. This fascinating approach ensures that, while 
Parliament has the final say, both the judicature (through the investigation of the Judicial 
Conduct Panel) and the executive (through the Attorney-General as member of the 
Government) are involved in the process.  
On balance, while the New Zealand judiciary thus enjoy a great amount of protection, 
there is ultimately much power concentrated in the person of the Attorney-General who 
decides both on whom to appoint and on whom to subject to a removal from office by 
Parliament. This should however not distract from the fact that New Zealand has found 
sound solutions for the problems posed by the appointment, discipline and removal of 
judges. 
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